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1. Introduction
Economists have long taken an interest in migration. At first, this interest was focused on why
migration occurs; it was seen mainly as geographic mobility of labour  in response to better
income opportunities elsewhere, and as such a major factor in the process of economic
development (Lewis 1954, Fei & Ranis  1964, Harris & Todaro 1970; Todaro 1976). The effects
of migration have also been studied, as for instance the remittances from migrants stimulating
economic growth in their areas of origin (Stark & Lucas 1988, Adams 1991, Brown 1990). In
the field of forced migration, however, economic research is extremely scanty. It may be
supposed that economists tend to regard involuntary migration as outside their domain, since it
is caused by arbitrary political factors and not by the free play of market forces. At the World
Bank, there has been an interest in displacement of people caused by development projects such
as large dams, but even there the research has come more from sociologists than from
economists (Cernea 1995; World Bank 1996); where economists have been involved, their
contribution has been on a project basis, not theoretical reflection on the economics of
displacement. A recent volume on migration theories from the field of economics does not even
mention forced migration (Massey et al. 1998).
To be sure, migration research by economists has yielded useful insights that can be applied also
to the study of forced migration (cf. The Economist 1997). But work specifically on forced
migration has been almost completely lacking, a fact that caused World Bank sociologist
Michael Cemea to lament:
Offkial  misunderstanding or sheer ignorance about the complex economics of displacement and
recovery are simply appalling in many agencies and countries. Many pitfalls in current  practice
can be traced to the sorry state of the economic research on resettlement and to the flawed
prescriptions for economic and financial analysis, and for planning in this domain. (Cemea 1995:
260)
Cemea is concerned mainly with persons displaced by development. In the field of refugee
studies, I know of no other research by economists than Wijbrandi’s (1986) and my own
(Kuhlman 1994). Hence I am compelled to talk about the potential rather than the actual
contribution of economics to this field. The lack of participation by economists in the
discussions on refugees, displaced persons and their resettlement problems is disastrous, because
- as I hope to show - economic aspects are a crucial part of the social problems surrounding
forced migration, and our shortcomings in the understanding of these problems help perpetuate
the wrong policies. Greater attention from economists would not only benefit refugee studies
(and eventually, it is to be hoped, refugee policies), but also the discipline of economics itself.
The study of refugees and forced migration is a field for interdisciplinary research par
excellence, and cross-fertilization with other social sciences is good for economics as well as for
its sister disciplines.
The study of forced migration, like that of migration in general, can be divided into research on
causes and on consequences - i.e. what happens after migration has occurred. I shall talk about
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each of these, and indicate what economics might have to say about them. The paper will then
focus on the particular topic that I have been concerned with: the economic aspects of
integration of refugees in poor countries, which includes the impact of refugees on their hosts.
This will be illustrated by experiences from my own research on Eritrean refugees in the Eastern
Sudan.
2. The causes of forced migration
Without wanting to waste time on sterile definition discussions, I shall at least indicate what I
mean with forced migration. This is important, because ‘forced’ is not an unambiguous term;
deportation is obviously forced, but there are many situations where not all people leave,
implying that there is still some sort of choice. Is flight from famine forced migration? If so,
why not flight f?om  unemployment? Clearly the aspect of choice or force is a matter of degree. I
propose to regard forced migration as migration under duress, in the face of a crisis of some
sort. A crisis means that the condition is limited in time, the result of an event or a series of
events, rather than a long-term condition. Duress implies that forced migration is explained
mainly not by the motivation of the migrant, but by the crisis that made him flee.
It goes almost without saying that most forced migration, whether international or within the
borders of a country, is caused directly or indirectly by the state. After all, the state claims a
monopoly on violence, and this means that violence which is sustained enough to make people
abandon their homes must be either committed or abetted by the state; examples of the latter
case are the ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia in 1992/96,  the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the
‘Kalenjin warriors’ in Kenya in 1992/94,  and the ‘pro-Indonesian militia’ in East Timor in 1999.
It is only where the state has ceased to function that groups can commit terror without
government blessing - as in the recent civil wars in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. These
gruesome examples do not mean that forced migration is inevitably wicked: sometimes people
are moved for the greater benefit of the nation at large (as in the case of development projects) or
even for their own good (as in the case of evacuation because of natural disasters). The latter
case is also the main one where forced migration may occur without state involvement;
significantly, people displaced by natural disasters nearly always remain within the borders of
their own country. Whenever a country generates international refugees, you can be certain that
violence is involved even if the ostensible cause may be famine (as in Ethiopia in 1984/85).  A
case where refugees were regarded as famine victims but were actually people whose survival
strategy had collapsed because of war is described by De Waal(1988).
On the basis of this recognition, a typology  of forced migration can be designed: classifying the
agents causing it, their motivation (where the agent has volition), and the means they use to
make it happen; only the destination is (in most cases) chosen by the migrant. Such a typology  is
shown in Figure 1. Admittedly, in the case of slave trade and related phenomena the role of the
state is more marginal, but then the quantitative importance of these forms of migration today is
small. The figure also shows the nature of the process of displacement itself, and the type of
destination - internal or external, organized from above from the very start or chosen by the
migrants themselves. Furthermore, the figure expresses the observed phenomenon that where
people are forced to flee their homes because of persecution or random violence, they will
usually first attempt to stay within their home country and leave only when they see no other
possibility. *
* Exceptions to this rule are what Kunz (1973) calls majority-alienated refugees, and groups who live near the
border and who have close relations to ethnic kin on the other side.
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Figure 1. A typology of displacement?
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Most of the literature on the causes of flight, insofar as it involves violence and persecution
rather than natural disasters or development projects, has come from historians and political
scientists (Adelman 1989). It appears to be generally accepted now that most of the forced
displacement which has taken place in history is closely linked to the emergence of the nation-
state (Zolberg et al. 1989, Smith 1994, Cohen 1997). Arisen out of conglomerations of feudal
territories or where kings increased their power at the expense of feudal lordq3  the boundaries of
European states were originally largely arbitrary as they delimited whatever territory happened
to be under the control of one ruler. But as their subjects became increasingly troublesome in the
wake of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, it became necessary to justify the
existence of the state with the concept of the nation. This was not everywhere an asset to the
* For alternative classifications, see Kunz (1973),  Richmond (1993) and Van Hear (1998).
3 Examples of the former are Germany, Italy and the Netherlands; of the latter: England and France.
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rulers: the Romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century led to many movements for national
emancipation against the status quo, and shortly after World War I this emancipation had been
achieved almost everywhere in Europe.
Thus, in both the older and in the newer nation-states of Europe, national identity was
emphasized, but there was hardly any state where ‘the nation’ actually corresponded with a
historical and cultural reality4  Very few European states were ever ethnically homogeneous, and
even in those few there is nearly always an artificial boundary dividing an ethnic group between
two states. Obscuring those inconvenient complexities has meant excluding those groups that
did not fit into the national identity - a potent source of instability if the groups are large enough,
and the main cause of flight and violent displacement where they are not. This is true with a
vengeance in many developing countries, where the idea of a nation-state is more novel and
hence less easily accepted.
A better understanding of the processes that have governed the rise of nation-states will also help
us to understand the root causes of refugee problems (including internally displaced persons
insofar as the displacement has been due to conflict rather than development or natural disaster).
That such comprehension will also help to prevent or solve refugee problems is perhaps hoping
for too much; but as scientists we must pursue knowledge for its own sake, the useful
application of which may or may not come about. However that may be, this line of research is,
of course first and foremost the province of political theorists and historians; but economics has
some contribution to make as well. That the formation of the modem state has its roots in
economics has long been recognized, by Karl Marx among others. That its spread throughout the
world is linked with the rise of industrial society as a global civilization has been asserted by
Wallerstein (1984). The enormous and unprecedented global economic divergence between rich
and poor to which this process has led is a major factor in forced migration. That economics is
important in understanding forced migration is not in doubt; But what do economists have to say
about its causes?
There is at present in economics a body of literature known as the New Institutional Economics.
Abandoning the neoclassical practice of treating institutions and values as given, the scholars in
this school study the interaction of culture, law and political structure with economic forces.
Other than the school of economic anthropology (which sits on the other side of the disciplinary
fence), neo-institutional economics uses the conceptual framework of individual rationality and
the language of economic theory to explain the phenomena it studies. This has led to important
insights in economic history (North & Thomas 1973, North 1990),  and these insights are being
applied also to political aspects of the development process (Harriss et al., 1995),  although not
as yet to the root causes of refugee problems. Such research could, however, be quite fruitful,
especially if it benefits f?om  the insights gained by students in other relevant disciplines, such as
the work done on political institutions in Africa  by Hyden (1983) and by Chabal & Daloz
(1999).
So much for those causes of forced migration that involve persecution. Now let us turn to those
cases where people do not flee from an enemy but from what are sometimes called ‘acts of
God’. Here the scientific analysis should come from such people as geologists and
meteorologists, who study and occasionally predict these disasters. But are they really acts of
4 Iceland is the only one. Switzerland, on the other hand, is the shining example of a state that is not based
nationalism in the sense I use it: it originated in opposition to the emerging nation-states, was multi-ethnic
the start and never needed to use ethnic chauvinism to keep its people together.
o n
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God, or do we humans have a hand in them too? Although an earthquake is a natural
phenomenon, its impact in Japan differs vastly from that in Nicaragua. It is us that make people
vulnerable to natural events. It would seem to me that economics ought to have something to say
about this. What are the costs and benefits of disaster-preparedness systems, and to what extent
is it justifiable to exclude those uses of land that render both the users and other people
vulnerable to natural disasters? While economic arguments should by no means be the only
ones, I think they deserve consideration - particularly in the case of a poor country that must
allocate its scarce resources wisely.
In this discussion, the economic concept of externalities is particularly helpful. When you look
at an economic activity, for instance clearing a piece of land, driving a car, or buying shares in
the stock exchange, you will evaluate its costs and benefits to the person or entity carrying out
that activity. However, this activity will also often have consequences for other people, and these
may be both negative (costs) or positive (benefits). For instance, by bringing a piece of forest
under cultivation, you may deprive others who were using the forest before, or you may cause
accelerated erosion further down the slope; on the other hand, you may also add to a belt of
cleared land which prevents the spread of tsetse flies, you may experiment with innovations that
others can later copy after you have taken the risk. These are consequences of your actions,
which when negative you do not pay for, and when positive you do not get any benefit from:
others pay the costs or reap the benefits, as the case may be. Now, the entire ideology of
capitalism is centred on the notion that we are all better off if economic actors can interact freely
in the market, because’by following their private interests they will actually promote the interest
of everyone. The main problem with this lies in externalities, because these are cases where
there is a discrepancy between private and social costs and benefits. And this is precisely why
externalities are a prime case of market failure, i.e. where the free play of market forces does not
lead to the best for all of us but to unpleasant consequences. And when there is market failure,
we must ask whether someone else should intervene - usually the government, which can issue
regulations to prohibit socially negative actions, or tax them to bring the private costs more in
agreement with the social ones, or subsidize activities with considerable social but meagre
private benefits.
In the case of natural disasters, when we see behaviour that makes people vulnerable
(unsustainable use of land, failure to take preventive measures), it is legitimate to ask whether
there may be externalities at play, and if so there is a very good justification to intervene.
Vulnerability to natural disasters may be part of the syndrome of underdevelopment, but it is not
always so that when you are poor you must suffer. Reducing vulnerability may be highly cost-
effective.
There is actually much more to this whole business of externalities than can be explained here.
Better than taxing and subsidizing would be a situation where private costs and benefits of
economic activities are more in agreement with social costs and benefits; this would lead to
individual economic actors doing what is good for the community. This is a matter of having the
right economic institutions, and it is the main topic of study for the neo-institutional school to
which I alluded earlier (Coase 1960).
Next, the case of forced migration in the interest of development. Here the role of economics is
obvious: if a dam is going to produce benefits to the country as a whole that exceed its cost, then
people will have to move. It is just part of the cost. Still, we may ask some questions, and these
can be awkward. First and foremost, has the cost to those who will be displaced been accurately
assessed? In practice, the cost has often been put at the market value of the property lost. This is
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usually not the same as the cost to those concerned of re-establishing their livelihood. To get a
realistic idea of the cost to the displaced, you have to estimate the counterfactual: the income
they would have obtained if they had stayed put, measured over the entire period of restoration
(Cemea 1995). An economist would call this the opportunity cost: by doing something you
forfeit the possibility of doing something else, and a realistic cost estimate has to take those lost
potential benefits into consideration. That such analysis has often been missing has caused much
suffering to the millions of people displaced every year; the World Bank nowadays insists on the
latter method as a basis for assessing compensation (World Bank 1996). Also, environmental
costs are often not adequately accounted for, because they do not show up so easily in national
accounts. All this does not mean that the decision to undertake a project is too narrowly based on
economic arguments alone - it means that the cost-benefit analysis has been done poorly;
economic analysis can take care of all costs and benefits that society considers relevant -
whether or not they show up in the form of money. Finally, we must never forget that also
government, which is theoretically there to serve the common interest, has private interests of its
own, and these may diverge from the interest of society at large - another case of externalities.
This results in a tendency to implement projects that are not profitable from a national point of
view, or not undertaking those that are. Donor agencies are usually too polite to point out these
externalities (and moreover have interests of their own), but sound economic analysis can show
them up.
In development projects large enough to warrant forced migration, economists are invariably
involved. As with other actors, this involvement is not always beneficial, but at least it has the
potential to be. What we need is broad-based research generalizing the findings from many of
these projects, and the knowledge acquired will improve the quality of the practical work of
cost-benefit analysis.
3. Consequences of forced migration
More important is the role of economics in examining the consequences of forced migration.
These consequences can be separated into those for the migrants themselves, for the recipient
country or area, and for the area of origin. Most often studied is what migration does to the
migrant: how do people cope with the loss of home, of income, with the trauma of violence, how
do they rebuild their lives, and what factors influence that process. Students of forced migration
tend to have strong sympathies for the displaced, and therefore the consequences of an influx of
people for the native population in the area where they resettle have been somewhat disregarded.
It is commonly believed that these consequences tend to be negative, and the researcher
exposing this would quite probably be accused of xenophobia; the fear of ostracism has
undoubtedly contributed to the neglect of this field of study. This neglect is unfortunate also for
the migrants themselves, because it leaves opinions to be formed on the basis of prejudice rather
than evidence. It is not at all certain that we suffer from an influx of immigrants - rather the
contrary. Or could that be the truth which we are reluctant to face? Also for the region of origin
there are consequences; sometimes these are intended, e.g. when it is desired to empty an area of
inhabitants so that the land can be used for something else. However, most consequences are
unintended, and they may be negative or positive. There has to my knowledge been very little
research on this: who has gone to the Sudan to study the effect of the mass flight of southern
Sudanese on the South? And in accounting for the social change you find, how will you
distinguish between the effects of flight and other effects of the war?
Those students of forced migration who work on the side of what happens once migration has
started (as opposed to how it started in the first place) have included lawyers (dealing with
asylum questions, pre-eminent in rich countries), sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists
(studying the famed ‘refugee syndrome’), and some geographers (Black 1991). A large part of
the literature on the subject, however, comes f?om  applied research and reports, from
practitioners in the agencies dealing with refugees and displaced persons. Economists have
played only a very minor role in this line of research.
Another way of dividing up the field is according to ‘refugee outcomes’. In the parlance of
UNHCR, there are three so-called durable solutions to a refugee situation, namely (in order of
preference) voluntary repatriation, local integration (i.e. in the country of first refuge), and third-
country resettlement. Extending this to internally displaced persons, we may speak of return and
resettlement, without the option of resettlement in a different country. I do not like the
terminology of durable solutions very much, because they imply that we are dealing with
problems which can be solved (cf. Aga Khan & Bin Talal 1986, Harrell-Bond 1989). Very often
they cannot, we can at best mitigate their consequences; and by striving for the impossible we
may fail to achieve the possible. In any case, UNHCR’s mandate is not really to ‘solve’ refugee
problems at all: it is to protect refugees, to assume the role of the state for them since they no
longer have a state which has the duty to look after their interests. With these reservations, we
can study the possible outcomes of return, local integration and resettlement in a third country
with all their implications.
This gives us the following schematic research agenda for the consequences of forced migration
(Figure 2). We could, if desired, make a further distinction here between international refugees
and the internally displaced - a distinction which I regard as fundamental, although I know this
is not generally agreed. We must now proceed to say what economics can contribute to the eight
categories listed in the figure.
Figure 2. Research agenda for the consequences of forced migration
AfSected  entity
refugees/displaced region/county of region/country of
persons settlement origin
return 1 . re-integration
I
Outcome local integration 2. integration
5
4. impact of influx
6 . impact of
returnees
7. effects of
1 population loss
resettlement 3. asylum,
integration
5. impact of influx 8. remittances
The research in which I took part was concerned with local integration of refugees, as well as
with their impact on the region of settlement; this corresponds to categories 2 and 4 in the
figure.
5 This category has been left empty; but one could, of course, study the effect of refugees who have first settled
in an area and then left again; I would tend to group such research under category 4.
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When we consider that the overwhelming majority of refugees and displaced persons
originate from poor countries and also resettle in poor countries, it will be clear that for this
majority the problems of poverty and sheer survival are pre-eminent. It is, of course, precisely
for this reason that the refugee industry in developing countries is largely concerned with the
provision of relief and rehabilitation - even though this is perhaps a mistake as I hope to
argue. In any case, we are talking economics here: how do you help people most effectively to
survive, what should be the role of relief and how can rehabilitation be promoted? There is
much literature on integration, but most of it comes from aid practitioners, and is not
concerned with theorizing and therewith drawing lessons for the future (cf. Adelman 1989,
Cooper 1994, Van Hear 1998a). Where social scientists have been involved, they have nearly
always been sociologists and anthropologists, with a smattering of political scientists,
psychologists and geographers. Economic analysis of integration has been sadly lacking. I
came across a striking example in an article in the Journal of Refugee Studies of a few years
ago, on income-generating activities of refugees from the Western Sahara. Nowhere in that
article is there anything to show what income refugees derived from the activities, whether
indeed they were at all commercially feasible. It is apparently considered sufficient when
refugees have something to keep them busy (Thomas & Wilson 1996).
Similarly, the impact of refugees on the host country, and of internally displaced on the region
of settlement, is in dire need of economic analysis. If rich countries complain that they cannot
absorb an influx equivalent to 0.5 per cent of their population, what would it mean to a region
in the Sudan to receive an additional 10% of its population? The economic aspect of this
impact is of overwhelming importance to the local people, who fear having to share scarce
employment, government services and declining natural resources with the newcomers.
Research on this has been relatively scant, and economic research even more so?
An interesting theme for interdisciplinary research in this category would be the impact of
migrants on social capital. With this is meant the degree of social organization to the extent
that such organization helps to augment incomes, including non-monetary income such as
food security or access to public services. There is considerable interest in social capital at
present; it has been shown to be positively related to income and wellbeing, and for the poor it
may be a more important resource than, say, education level (cf. Narayan & Pritchett 1999). It
would be highly relevant to study how the coming of a large number of strangers would affect
social capital. To the refugees themselves, the loss of social capital is an important aspect of
their suffering, and it may be a principal cause of the ‘refugee syndrome’ (cf. Allen & Turton
1996). Here is a clear link with anthropological research, and a possibly fruitful area for
interdisciplinary work. The work of Scudder and Colson on the long-term adjustment process
of people who were displaced because of the Kariba dam in Zimbabwe and Zambia covers
these aspects (e.g. Colson 1971; for examples of contributions by economists on the role of
civil society in economic development, see Platteau 1994).
Repatriation of refugees (category 1) is a hot issue at present. Phrases such as ‘safe havens’
and ‘the right to remain’ are being touted as ‘durable solutions’. Refugee students, as evident
fi-om  articles in recent years in JRS, correctly see them as attempts to deny the root cause of
refugee problems, and to keep refugees out of asylum. In cases where the root cause has
disappeared, refugees have usually repatriated by themselves without external assistance -
except in cases where they had remained in the host country for a long time, and where a
6 Macchiavello (1999) has compared three field studies which give evidence on the impact of refugees in
Zambia, Malawi and the Sudan.
8
return home would entail significant economic deprivation (Kibreab 1996). The same should
be true for internal refugees from violence; I strongly suspect that these people will be able to
pick up their lives again, although the disruption will mean that they have lost so many years
of potential development - the opportunity cost again. As for people displaced by
development, they will of course not usually be able ever to return to their former homes; and
for those fleeing from.  natural disasters, as in the case of other returnees it is likely that while
their lives have suffered disruption they will be able to re-establish themselves with or without
external aid, and that the economic effect of the disaster will be temporary. This does not
mean, of course, that they should not receive aid.
As regards the integration of refugees in rich countries (category 3),  here economic aspects are
less pre-eminent: the main problems of refugees are getting there and being allowed to stay in
the first place, and thereafter coping with a different socio-cultural environment. Law,
psychology, sociology and anthropology are likely to be the more important fields of study.
The impact of refugees on rich countries (category 5) differs from that on poor countries as
category 3 is different from category 2. Yet, here too, the economic impact is a crucial theme
of research, as I have stated before. There has been significant research on the impact of
migrants in countries such as the United States, and it is not by far as negative as many people
believe - in fact rather the opposite (The Economist 1997). Even in western Europe, not a
region that has much welcomed immigration in recent centuries, there are good reasons to
expect that the impact of the present immigration from poorer regions will be an economic
boon in the longer term. This is not to argue that the flow of immigrants should be
unrestrained - merely that the alarm many of us feel at the current level of immigration is
motivated more by xenophobia than by a danger of losing our prosperity. More economic
research may help to dispel some of this alarm.
Finally, a few words on the impact of forced migration on the region of origin (categories 6, 7
and 8). There have been studies on the remittances sent home by migrants from poor to rich
areas; in the case of refugees such relationships are not always possible, but they often are
(e.g. the case of Cuban-Americans). Such remittances have, of course, a positive direct effect
on the level of income of the recipients; whether they also have a positive long-term effect on
the productive capacity of the region of origin is less certain, and depends on a number of
factors such as the opportunity to invest locally (not easy in a socialist country or where
markets are distorted for other reasons). Areas that heavily rely on an external source of
income may also suffer from ‘Dutch disease’, which makes their products less competitive
(cf. Brown 1990). The impact of population loss has been studied in some historical cases,
and can be both positive and negative for economic development.’ This will depend on
whether the region in question should be considered as over- or underpopulated in an
economic sense; but even in the former case sudden departure of many people will at least
cause disruption, especially considering the categories of people most likely to leave. As for
the impact of a return flow, I strongly suspect that this will usually turn out to be positive.
’ Emigration from Europe to the New World in the 19*  and early 20* centuries is believed to have had a positive
effect on the European economies (Galbraith 1979). On the other hand, the dramatic population loss suffered by
European countries in the plagues of the 14*  century is seen as a negative factor in development (Slither  van
Bath 1987).
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4. Economic integration of refugees in poor countries
As mentioned earlier, my own research was on local integration of refugees (category 2 of our
agenda); integration was defined there as including their impact on the host country (category
4). The approach we followed is, I think, a useful illustration of the contribution that an
economist can make to an essentially interdisciplinary field of study.
Our first task was to define integration. It may be defined either as a process or as an outcome
to which that process is supposed to lead: when are you integrated? For us, the outcome was
what we needed: we wanted a yardstick to assess economic integration. At first sight, this
seems simple: if a refugee has achieved a standard of living similar to the average of the host
country, then that refugee may be considered economically integrated. However, the Sudan is
a plural society in the sense of the anthropologist J.S. Fumivall (1939): not only ethnically
heterogeneous and socially stratified, but where the social stratification is ethnically bound. In
other words, the ethnic group to which you belong determines your socio-economic status to a
significant extent. In such a situation, an average standard of living has little meaning in social
reality. Let me give an example. Refugees belong to an ethnic group which straddles the
border and they have been received by their kinsmen in the host country, with whom they
share the meagre resources available. They are very poor, poorer than the national average;
however, this poverty is not a consequence of their refugee status but part of the situation of
that particular ethnic group in the host country. Another group, who do not have ethnic kin in
the host country, settle in towns; most of them are well educated, but they are forced to take
menial jobs as the positions commensurate with their skills are closed to them; yet, their
income is higher than that of the first group. An approach looking simply at averages would
conclude that the first group are poorly integrated, and the latter better. An analysis of the
social complexities will lead to the opposite conclusion.
So, just comparing the average refugee with the average host-country national may not tell
you all that much if you are dealing with a plural society - of which there are many in
developing countries. We had to look for a more sophisticated concept of integration, one that
would take into consideration (a) the possibility of a plural society; (b) the multi-dimensional
nature of integration (cultural, psychological, social and economic); and (c) the impact of
refugees on the host society as well as the position of the refugees themselves. One would
think that the concept of integration must be rather important in refugee studies, but it was not
easy to find a good definition in the literature, and none that addresses the aforementioned
concerns. I had to go to the wider literature on migration. The most appropriate
conceptualization I found in the scheme drawn up by the Canadian social psychologist John
Berry (Figure 3). In this scheme, the process by which the migrant adapts to his new
environment is called acculturation, and integration is one of four possible outcomes. For an
analysis going beyond the cultural dimension, I prefer the term adaptation for the process,
rather than the narrower term acculturation. Following this scheme, integration would be that
outcome of an adaptation process where the migrants maintain their own identity, yet become
part of the host society to the extent that host population and refugees can live together in an
acceptable way. Such a concept has the advantage that it is applicable to a plural society, and
that it can be studied in many aspects - cultural, psychological, even legal, and also
economical. However, it is still very vague, so we have to specify it - particularly the word
‘acceptable’. I have used the following formulation: refugees can be considered truly
integrated
l if they participate in the host economy in ways commensurate with their skills and
compatible with their cultural values;
1 0
if they attain a standard of living which satisfies culturally determined minimum
requirements (standard of living is taken here as meaning not only income from economic
activities, but also access to amenities such as housing, public utilities, health services, and
education); if the socio-cultural change they undergo permits them to maintain an identity
of their own and to adjust psychologically to their new situation;
if standards of living and economic opportunities for members of the host society have not
deteriorated due to the influx of refugees;
if friction between host population and refugees is not worse than within the host
population itself; and
if the refugees do not encounter more discrimination than exists between groups previously
settled within the host society.
Figure 3. Berry’s acculturation model
Relations
Maintenance of cultural identity:
YES N O
with other
groups:
YES integration
NO separation
assimilation
marginalization
We now have a set of criteria which can be operationalized for research in different
disciplines. It is easy to do this for the economic aspects:
l how and to what extent the refugees’ basic needs such as food, water, shelter, health and
education are met; and
l how their presence affects the population of the host country in terms of incomes, income-
earning opportunities, and access to natural resources and public services.
The next step is to design a model that will explain integration. For this I took as a basis the
theory developed by Egon Kunz, who formulated what as far as I know was the first
theoretical framework for refugee resettlement (Kunz 1981). This was supplemented by a
model for immigrant adaptation in Canada by Goldlust  & Richmond (1974). On the basis of
these two, I designed the model shown in Figure 4. This is a comprehensive one, but we can
operationalize it specifically for the economic aspects of integration. These were defined as
follows: economic aspects of the adaptation process have to do with how and to what extent
the refugees’ basic needs such as food, water, shelter, health and education are met; and with
how their presence affects the population of the host country in terms of incomes, income-
earning opportunities, and access to natural resources and public facilities - the goods where
access is not defined by income level. A model for this was also prepared (Figure 5).
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A. Characteristics of refugees
1. demographic characteristics
2. socio-economic characteristics
3. ethno-cultural affiliation
Figure 4. A comprehensive model of refugee integration
B. Flight-related factors
1. root cause of flight
2. type of  movement
3. attitude to displacement
E. Residence in host country
1. length of residence
2. movements within country of asylum
+
C. Host-related factors
1. macro-economic situation
2. natural-resource base of settlement
region
3. ethno-cultural makeup of settlement
region
4. social stratification
5. socio-political orientation
6. auspices
.
Adaptation: assimilation
integrat ion
separation
marginalization
Impact on refugees
Objective aspects Subjective aspects
ident i ty
internalization
satisfact ion
legal  r ights
spat ial  integrat ion
economic integration
culture change
social  relat ions
1
D. Policies
1. national
2. regional/local government
3. foreign donors
1
Objective aspects Subjective aspects
atti tudes towards refugees
.
Impact on hosts
overall income
employment
other aspects  of  l iving
standards
strat i f icat ion
natural resources
infrastructure
culture change
securi ty
12
Figure 5. A model for the economic dimension of refugee integration
A. Characteristics of refugees
1. demographic variables
2. socio-economic background
3. ethno-cultural affiliation
B. Flight-related factors
1. root cause of flight
2. type of movement
3. attitude to displacement
E. Residence in host country
1. length of residence
2. movements within country of asylum
C. Host-related factors
1. macro-economic situation
2. natural-resource base of settlement
region
3. ethno-cultural makeup of settlement
region
4. social stratification
5. socio-political orientation
6. auspices
D. Policies
1. national
2. regional/ local  government
3. foreign donors
Non-economic dimensions of adaptation
Objective aspects
legal  r ights
spat ial  integrat ion
culture change
social  relat ions
securi ty
Subjective aspects
atti tudes towards refugees
ident i ty
internalization
satisfact ion
Economic adaptation
Impact on refugees
1. part icipat ion in economy*
2. income*
3. access to non-income goods and services*
Impact on hosts
1. employment*
2. income*
3. availability of non-income goods and services*
4. infrastructure
5. natural resources
13
* Differentiated by socio-economic categories
5. A summary of the findings
So much for the theory. I shall also give a brief account of our findings which show how the
above concepts and models were applied. For a full account, I refer to Kuhlman (1994). The
study in question was based on two separate field studies: one carried out in 1986/87  by a
joint Dutch-Sudanese team (from the Free University Amsterdam and the University of
Khartoum) with some Eritrean participation as well; this part was financed by Dutch bilateral
aid, and it was concerned specifically with the impact of refugees, although in the process data
on the situation of refugees themselves were also collected (Kuhlman 1990). The other part
was carried out in the same period by the University of the Saar in Germany; it so happened
that their data complemented ours very well, and they generously put them at my disposal.
The case: Eritreans in Kassala
From 1967 onwards the regions of the Sudan bordering on Eritrea began to receive a flow of
refugees from the guerrilla war being waged against the Ethiopians - or to be more precise, from
the campaign of terror waged by the Ethiopian army as its counter-insurgency strategy. This
flow continued right up to Eritrea’s de facto independence in 1991. By the time our fieldwork
started there were over 700,000 of them in the country. The border region of Kassala had just
over 150,000 of them, making up 21% of the population. At this time there was one large
refugee camp near the town of Kassala housing 36,000 people (not all of them necessarily
refugees) who were being fed by international aid; the remainder lived among the local
population, either in the town or in the surrounding rural area. The Sudanese government was far
from happy with them being there: it worried about the negative impact such a large influx of
people would have on a poor country and appealed to the international community for aid to
deal with the problem. The UNHCR marshalled the aid, and recommended to allocate virgin
land in the vast expanses of the country to resettle the refugees. The Sudan would donate the
land, the UNHCR and its backers would provide the investment to make it productive and the
funds to tide the settlers over the initial difficult period. This, it was thought, would remove the
burden from the local population, make waste land productive and make the refugees self-reliant
instead of dependent on aid. Similar thinking, by the way, has been pervasive throughout Africa
over the last few decades.
This policy, on the face of it, did not work particularly well: we estimated that in 1986/87  only
about 3 1% of all Eritrean refugees were actually in camps; over two thirds were so-called self-
settled, in spite of the fact that they received little or no aid (nearly all of which went to the
camps and settlement schemes) and were actively discouraged by the Sudanese authorities who
often severely harassed them? This paradox presented an interesting topic for research: why
would people prefer the vagaries of a harsh natural and social environment to the fleshpots of
international aid? Therewith, one of the most important questions for our research was given:
how did the official policy of organized resettlement affect economic integration?
Comparing integration settings
It was said before that the Sudan is a plural society, and we needed to find out how the refugees
fitted into the existing socio-economic stratification as well as how they affected it. Hence, a
classification of households was made based on (a) the extent to which the household functioned
as a production unit (in addition to being a consumption unit); (b) if it did, to what extent it
produced for the market; (c) its access to land and capital; and (d) if it did not, what positions on
* For an account of what happened to these refugees after Eritrea’s independence, see Kibreab (1996) and
Bascom (1998).
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the labour market did its members occupy: employer, self-employed, or employed by others;
and if the latter, under what terms - fixed or casual. This led us to seven categories which we
called employment classes, and this was one of the most important measures of economic
integration (our dependent variable). Based on the model in Figure 5, the policy factor can be
operationalized into a distinction between self-settled refugees and those in organized
settlements, in order to see where integration works better; however, we need to specify a little
more, because there are different types of organized settlements, and among the self-settled there
is a big difference between rural and urban settlers. We can distinguish seven integration
settings, as I have called them; you may see this as an operationalization of the policies together
with host-related factors. One of the most crucial tests was now to see how ‘employment class’
was correlated with ‘integration setting’. Our data showed quite a high correlation (Table 1): in
the settlements there are large proportions of people who do not participate in any economic
Table 1. Correlation between ‘integration setting’ and ‘employment class’
ORGANIZED SETTLEMENTS
peri- land wage- Row to ta l
u r b a n se t t lemt . earning
se t t lemt .
(115) (131) (118) (910)’
6.5
SELF-SETTLED REFUGEES
Set t ing . Khar- Kassala rural rural
town (comm. (subs is t .
agric .) agric.)
W=) (125) (141) (137) (143)
Employment  c lass .
1. employer 3.6 1.7 3.8
2. self-employed, 11.1 31.2 37.2 16.8 5.9 4.4
non-farming
3. self-employed, - 2.7 34.7 62.5 30.6
farming
4. fixed job, 28.1 37.7 4.1 5.3 15.8 8.7
skilled
5. fixed job, 23.5 9.0 13.2 3 0. 4.6 9.3
unski l led
6. casual labour 17.6 15.9 9.1 6.4 13.2 3.8
OdY
7. no economic 19.6 - 2.3 60.5 43.2
act ivi ty
Tota l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Row percentage 13.7 15.5 15.1 15.7 12.6 14.4
Number of Missing Observations (i.e. where the employment class could not be determined) = 90
1.4’
16.8
8 20.0
8.9 15.5
3.2 9.4
8.1 10.5
72.6 26.33
100.0
13.0
100.0
100.0
S ta t i s t i c Value
Kendall’s Tau C -.24704
S o m e r s ’  D -.24730
Spearman’s R -.3436
Signi f icance
.oooo
.oooo
Notes.
1 In the settings for which the data come from the University of the Saar, employers are subsumed
under class 2.
2 The percentages of households without economic activity as given in this table are percentages of
the total number of which the employment class is known.
3 The numbers of cases as recorded here are not the actual ones, but adjusted according to a
system of case-weights .
Source: Kuhlman, 1994, p.  241.
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activity, and very few refugees in the higher strata of the social structure - no employers, few
self-employed people. Furthermore, while there are differences between urban and rural refugees
and within the rural group between those who are subsistence-oriented farmers and those who
are wage workers in commercial agriculture, the largest differences are between the self-settled
refugees and those in organized settlements: the former are much better off.
Is this really so? I can think of three criticisms: first, what is the influence of other factors (such
as education level, previous occupation, ethnicity, household composition including gender) on
economic integration as measured by employment class? Second, what if the characteristics of
the populations differ by integration setting? Could that not explain the observed differences in
integration achieved, rather than the integration setting itself? E.g. perhaps it is the resource-poor
who tend to go to the camps, but not the camp environment that causes their poverty. Third, are
we really sure that the measure ‘employment class’ is an adequate yardstick for economic
resilience or standard of living? All of these questions were addressed in the research. On the
first, we found fairly strong correlations for some other factors, but none as strong as the impact
of integration setting; on the second, whereas the populations of the different settings vary by
ethnic@,  socio-economic background and settlement history, the correlation between those
factors and integration setting is stronger than that between those same factors and employment
class; in other words, people in organized settlements are worse off not because they are
unskilled or belong to disadvantaged groups, but because of being in those settlements. Finally,
on the validity of ‘employment class’ as a yardstick of prosperity, we did correlate employment
class with two proxies for consumptive wealth: housing standard and the extent to which food
security was seen as a major problem in the household; on both of them there was generally a
good correlation with employment class, except that the self-employed whom we classed higher
than employees were in fact worse off than skilled employees - not an altogether surprising
finding. We also looked at evidence from other studies which had produced data on employment
and income among refugees. These largely corroborate our findings that the self-settled are
better off everywhere.
Thus, one important question has been answered, namely why most refugees do not live in the
settlements where the govemment and UNHCR want them to be and where they receive aid:
they are better off by themselves, without aid. But this finding alone would have been a meagre
result from such a research project. We also looked at how well integrated the self-settled
refugees really are, and what factors determine their economic integration. This must be done, of
course, by comparing them to the Sudanese. We included Sudanese households in our research,
and found that the differences are larger in urban than in rural areas. However, as argued before,
in a plural society averages have little meaning, and now I must tell you something about the
Kassala region.
Die position of self-settled refugees in the Kassala region
This is a region which until the early 19th century was inhabited by a variety of nomadic tribes,
the largest of whom are the Hadendoa and the Beni ‘Amer, fiercely antagonistic towards one
another. After the Sudan was colonized by the Egyptians in the 182Os,  Kassala developed into a
town and new groups migrated towards the region: firstly Arabic-speaking Nubians from the
Nile Valley who took up commerce and employment as civil servants, and secondly West
Afi-ican  people (such as Hausa and Fula) who worked as manual labourers. Development
received a new impetus in the 192Os,  when a large irrigation scheme for growing cotton was set
up in the Gash Delta, in the vicinity of Kassala. The nomads, meanwhile, were impoverished
because their livelihood as transporters (camel caravans) was destroyed by the railway and later
by road transport; and because the end of tribal warfare meant more people, more animals on a
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more limited grazing area - hence slow degradation of the rangeland. The Beni ‘Amer suffered
the most and were forced to shift towards rainfed  agriculture, in an area which is very marginal
and more suited for nomadic pasture. The Hadendoa were able to continue their traditional
lifestyle, thanks to their stake in the Gash Delta irrigation scheme: they were the landlords to
whom the actual farmers paid a share of the crops; yet, they too were poorer than before.
And now the Eritreans. To begin with, the Beni ‘Amer have always lived on both sides of the
border, and nomadic families used to migrate across it seasonally. When Eritrean Beni ‘Amer
began to flee to the Sudan in 1967, they were not seen as foreigners by their ethnic kin in the
Sudan, and they were given land there. The Hadendoa (who do not live on the Eritrean side) and
the urban people (most of whom had their roots in distant lands) did, however, point at them as
undesirable aliens. Eritreans from other tribes which in Eritrea have a lowly status (notably the
Baria and Baza) had started coming to the Kassala region in the 194Os,  in order to work as
seasonal labourers in the developing horticultural area of the Gash Basin near Kassala (there
were no longer enough West A~~I.II~),  and fkom  the 1960s also in the large-scale mechanized
agriculture which was being developed in the southern part of the Kassala region. The large
numbers of refugees coming into the region from 1967 onwards were often first settled in camps
along the border, but not always: there were also many who immediately found refuge with local
people. Those hosts were either refugees who had come earlier or (in the case of the Beni
‘Amer) friendly  Sudanese. From 1978 onwards, the refugees also included Christians from the
Eritrean highlands, who were much more alien to the Sudanese than the Muslim lowlanders.
How did they find work? This depends on who they were. The Beni ‘Amer (the largest group)
often joined their kinsmen in their marginal subsistence agriculture - making it even more
marginal. Irrigated agriculture in the Gash Basin and mechanized agriculture south of Kassala
expanded enormously and took up many refugees as cheap labourers. In the town of Kassala,
there was an exodus of skilled labour in the 1970s - towards the oil-producing countries of
Arabia. The Eritreans - particularly the highlanders - filled many of the positions these Sudanese
had vacated. Furthermore, the money that these expatiate Sudanese earned was invested most
often in building, in hotels and restaurants, or in transport operations; both refugees and West
Afkicans found work in these sectors. Finally, there was a flourishing smuggling trade between
Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Sudan, carried on mostly by Eritrean refugees. What we see in the last
three decades is a modest emancipation of the West Africans  from unskilled labourers to
positions of skilled labourers (such as drivers), small fanners and small traders; the refugees
moved into the positions left vacant by that process.
Thus, we see that the refugees were only the latest arrivals in a long line of migrants into the
Kassala region. They were able to find niches for themselves within the plural society, and each
ethnic group had its own niche just like those that came before. In the process this society was
altered, with changes in the relative positions of several groups. On the whole, those refugees
who did not have ethnic km in the Sudan took up lowly positions in the socio-economic
stratification, and their position was made much weaker because of official discrimination: they
could not get work permits, they could not get business permits, they could not organize
themselves into unions, etc. All this was because they were supposed to be in settlements.
The impact of refugees
In terms of aggregate production, we estimate that the large influx of refugees had a positive
effect; this estimate was made on the basis of changes in relative wealth in Kassala compared
with the Sudan as a whole over the period 1967-87. While it cannot be said that the area has
become richer (on the contrary), it has done better than the average for the country. The same is
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true for employment: in Kassala the situation is less bad than in the Sudan as a whole. However,
the impact has not been favourable for all socio-economic (read: ethnic) groups; some Sudanese
groups compete for jobs and markets with certain categories of refugees. Among those Sudanese
there is strong resentment, but only when the Sudanese-refugee divide coincides with an ethnic
one. The Beni ‘Amer,  on the other hand, readily share what little they have with a large number
of refugees who are also Beni ‘Amer.
It is commonly believed among Sudanese that refugees exert pressure on scarce resources:
housing, education, health, public utilities. This is easy to debunk: public utilities and social
services are poor because of the decay of government, not because of an increase in users. On
the contrary, a denser population ought to make it cheaper to provide these facilities, so the
influx could have led to better services - at least after an interval. As for housing, our research
showed that the cost of rent had actually decreased relative to other prices over the period under
consideration; this is because there has been so much investment in building by expatriate
Sudanese.
The environmental impact of refugees, meanwhile, is real. In small-scale agriculture, fallow
cycles are shortening, leading to accelerated exhaustion and erosion of the soil; trees are being
cut for making charcoal. These problems are not caused by refugees, but by a combination of a
particular economic situation and population growth; the refugees are a significant contributor to
the latter.
By the way, organized settlements, set up to cushion the impact on the host country, are not
without cost: the land earmarked for them turns out to be not as fi-ee as the government thought,
but played a part in the grazing schemes of nomads; those people lose, and the environmental
impact of cultivating marginal land is often not known but certainly more problematic in the
long term.
Conclusions
What can we learn from all this? Firstly, I think, our findings show the failure of attempts by
bureaucrats (whether in host governments or in aid organizations) to organize people’s lives
through planning. If you want to help refugees in poor countries, the best is to assist them in the
places where they are and in the activities they do; resettlement and income-generating projects
may well make them worse off. Studying their survival strategies will help to identify their
problems and point the way to how best to assist them. However, what they need more than
material assistance is the freedom to live their lives; this means a liberal policy in allowing them
to work, to do business, to rent and own real estate, to send their children to school.
This would be a hard thing for any host country government to swallow, and this is where aid
can be useful. Instead of avoiding the impact by putting the refugees into camps (which in any
case may not work), the aid funds would be put to better use by helping the country cope with
the impact. Research on refugee-affected areas can help to identify in what fields the impact is
most negative, and on which groups the burden falls, as well as where there are opportunities for
a beneficial effect. Assisting the social groups to which the refugees belong - without looking as
to who is a refugee - means that both the refugees and those suffering a negative impact would
be helped.
Interestingly, this calls for a rather different role of UNHCR than what it has played increasingly
in recent decades: instead of seeing refugees as people in material need who need assistance (to
be channeled through UNHCR), it would concentrate on protecting and promoting the rights of
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refugees. This is, of course, what it was set up to do; but it has become increasingly bogged
down in its aid role, and it often declines to insist on refugees’ rights for fear of jeopardizing its
relationship with the host government. After all, there is a common interest here: both UNHCR
and the host country government benefit from the flow of aid funds. That the refugees also
benefit is more questionable, as I have attempted to show. I believe that refugees need rights
more than material assistance, and this is why I have given my book the title Asylum or Aid. In
fairness, it must be said that there appears to be some recognition for such views in the aid
community (including UNHCR) in recent years (cf. Bascom 1998).
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